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It is believed that the courts generally have included the District
as a state where that was necessary in order to reach a proper re-
sult, a result consistent with the spirit of our democratic govern-
ment. Equality of citizens is a foundation stone of the American
government. This may be a situation in which the Supreme Court
will include the citizens of the District of Columbia as equals of
their fellow citizens in this respect, without deserting the principles
of the constitutional Union.
Charles W. Davidson, Jr.
The Power of the District Courts of the United States
To Remand or Dismiss as Affected by H. R. 3214
H.R. 3214, the proposed revision of title 28 of. the United States
Code,' omits the present Section 802 which reads as follows:
If in any suit commenced in a district court or removed
from a state court to a district court of the United States,
it shall appear to the satisfaction of said district court, at
any time after such suit has been brought or removed
thereto, that such a suit does not really and substantially
involve a dispute or controversy properly within the juris-
diction of said district court, or that the parties to said suit
have been improperly or collusively joined, either as plain-
tiffs or defendants, for the purpose of creating a case cog-
nizable or removable under this chapter, the said district
court shall dismiss the suit or remand it to the court from
which it was removed, as justice may require, and shall
make such order as to costs as shall be just.
H.R. 3214 provides that the district court shall "not have juris-
diction of a civil action in which any party... has been improperly
or collusively ... joined to invoke the jurisdiction of such court,"'
but omits the provision that the district court shall dismiss or re-
mand a suit when it appears that it "does not really and substanti-
ally involve a dispute or controversy properly within the jurisdic-
tion of said district court.14
Will this omission affect the power of the district court to dis-
miss cases coming before it for lack or loss of jurisdiction? The
Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives evi-
dently thought not for in referring to this omission it stated:
' Title 28 of the United States Code is being revised by the Congress
of the United States. This bill, which will replace the present title 28 was
passed by the House of Representatives as H.R. 3214 on July 7, 1947, and
was referred to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary.
236 STAT. 1090 (1911), 28 U.S.C. §80 (1940).
3H.R. 3214 §1359.
4 18 STAT. 470 (1875).
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Any court will dismiss a case not within its jurisdiction
when its attention is drawn to the fact, or even on its own
motion.,
If this be true of the district courts of the United States there
is, of course, no problem but it is questionable whether the answer
to the proposition may be so easily stated.
Among those who, would dissent from the opinion expressed
by the House Committee are Chadbourn and Levin who have made
a compelling argument for the necessity and utility of section 5
in general and for the part now to be omitted in particular.6
The position taken by these writers may be summarized some-
what in this manner: most cases over which the district courts of
the United States have jurisdiction involve a federal question, a
separable controversy, or diversity of citizenship. When a case con-
taining one of these elements is properly presented the court must
take jurisdiction.7 The number of cases which are cognizable by
the district courts is thus very great, especially in the field of the
federal question cases.8 Therefore, when in 1875 the Congress for
the first time conferred original jurisdiction of federal questions
upon the district courts, it inserted in the very act conferring juris-
diction a section which required the courts to dismiss or remand
any case which did not really and substantially involve a contro-
versy properly within the court's jurisdiction. 9 There are, by this
view, two standards for jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of the court
is vested by the allegation of the plaintiff's complaint but later, at
any point in the proceedings, the court may dismiss or remand the
cause under section 5 when it becomes apparent that the contro-
versy actually litigated is not a federal question. Thus jurisdiction
vests only to be later ousted by section 5. If this be a correct inter-
pretation of section 5 then the omitted clause should have been re-
tained in the bill.
A different view, but the-same conclusion, is expressed by an-
other writer on this subject.10 This author would declare that sec-
tion 5 allows the court to dismiss cases over which it took jurisdic-
r H.R. REP. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. A125 (1947).
6 Chadbourn and Levin, Original Jurisdiction of a Federal Question,
90 U. oF PA. L. Rzv. 639 (1942).
' Osborn v. Bank of U. S., 9 Wheat. 738 (U.S. 1824); Morgan's Heirs
v. Morgan, 2 Wheat. 290 (U.S. 1817); Kanouse v. Martin, 15 How. 198
(U.S. 1853).
sChadbourn and Levin, Original Jurisdiction of a Federal Question,
90 U. oF PA. L. R!v. 639, 649 (1942).
9 18 STAT. 470, 472 (1875), 28 U.S.C. §80 (1940) is the modern counter-
part of §5 and is substantially the same as the original act; the section
will be hereinafter referred to as §5.
10 Forrester, Federal Question Jurisdiction and Section 5, 18 TuL~zm
L. REv. 263 (1943).
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tion when the facts alleged are found not to exist. The theory here
is not that jurisdiction has been ousted but that jurisdiction which
had apparently vested did not really vest at all. This view has been
criticized1 but if it is a tenable position then Section 5 is needed as
authority to dismiss cases where the facts, by which jurisdiction
originally vested, have subsequently disappeared so that the suit
no longer involves, in any real sense, a controversy within the juris-
diction of the court; yet without section 5 the court could not
dismiss or remand.
Not all writers who have put pen to paper on this subject have
found section 5 so essential. G. Merle Bergman is of the opinion
that it was enacted by Congress so that the district courts could
dismiss or remand a case where jurisdiction had originally vested
but where the facts which originally gave jurisdiction no longer
exist.12 That is, it makes possible the ouster of jurisdiction which
had previously vested. However, he goes on to say:
It is more than likely, of course, that the courts would
construe this as a fraud upon their jurisdiction and oust
the case of their own accord, but Congress turned this likeli-
hood into a certainty by imposing the duty on the court.13
(Emphasis supplied)
Mr. Bergman clearly believes that the district court could dismiss
without the aid of section 5 but it is important to indicate at this
point that he speaks only of fraud upon the jurisdiction of the court.
As indicated earlier, the section dealing with jurisdiction improperly
or collusively obtained has been retained. " But he is not referring
to the case where jurisdiction properly vests and then the facts
which originally gave jurisdiction disappear. The parties may have
acted in utmost good faith and in such a situation the clause now
omitted would have permitted the court to remand.
One of the best treatments of the problem of divestment of
federal jurisdiction comes to the conclusion that the district courts
can dismiss or remand without the aid of section 5.15 The reasoning
is based upon the statutory history of that section.1
-"Bergman, Reappraisal of Federal Question Jurisdiction, 46 MICH.
L. RE v. 17, 31-32 (1947).2 Bergman, Reappraisal of Federal Question Jurisdiction, 46 McH.
L. REv. 17 (1947).
13 Bergman, Reappraisal of Federal Question Jurisdiction, 46 MICH.
L. RaV. 17, 33 (1947).
14 H.R. 3214 §1359 as passed by the House of Representatives July 7,
1947.
'5 Schlesinger and Strasburger, Divestment of Federal Jurisdiction, 39
COL. L. REV. 595 (1939).
16 Schlesinger and Strasburger, Divestment of Federal Jurisdiction, 39
COL. L. REV. 595, 623 (1939).
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TREATMENT IN THE CASES
As mentioned earlier in this article, Section 5 was enacted in
1875. A study of the cases since that time may indicate whether it
is necessary in order for the court to remand or dismiss a case where
jurisdiction, once vesting, has subsequently disappeared. 'The deci-
sions have developed two distinct lines of authority on this problem.
One line, headed by Kirby v. American Soda Fountain Co.,'7 treats
section 5 as applying only in cases where jurisdiction is gained by
collusion or bad faith. In the Kirby case the plaintiff sued in a
district court of Texas to cancel an obligation of $2,025 and for
$2,500 damages for fraud in the transaction in which the obligation
arose. The defendant, a foreign corporation, obtained removal to
the federal court on the ground of diversity of citizenship. Defen-
dant cross claimed for the unpaid balance of the obligation which
the plaintiff was seeking to have cancelled. This unpaid balance
was less than $2,000 which at that time was the jurisdictional mini-
mum. Plaintiff dismissed his suit against the defendant and pleaded
lack of jurisdiction in the federal court to hear the counterclaim.
The court held jurisdiction not divested and at least one ground of
the decision was that jurisdiction is not divested by a subsequent
change in conditions which reduces the amount in controversy be-
low the jurisdictional minimum. The court ignored section 5 and
based its decision on four cases decided prior to the enactment of
that section.' 8 Later cases following the Kirby case have at least
recognized that section 5 exists but would apply it only in cases
where collusion or bad faith are present."' It follows, under such
a view of section 5, that the proposed omission is justified as the
elimination of superfluous matter.
The other line of cases stems from Texas Transportation Co. v.
Seeligson,20 a case decided a few years before the Kirby case but not
overruled by it. In the Seeligson case A, a citizen of Texas, sued B,
a citizen of New York, and C, a citizen of Texas, in a Texas court.
B had the cause removed to the district court on the ground of a
separable controversy. A then dismissed his suit against B. The
court held that federal jurisdiction was lost and remanded the case
17194 U.S. 141 (1904)..
1 Morgan's Heirs v. Morgan, 2 Wheat. 290 (U.S. 1817); Clark v.
Mathewson, 12 Pet. 164 (U.S. 1838); Kanouse v. Martin, 15 How. 198 (U.S.
1853); Cooke v. U.S., 2 Wall. 218 (U.S. 1864).
19 See, especially, the opinion of Mr. Justice Roberts in St. Paul In-
demnity Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 295 (1938). Also see Jellison v.
Krell Piano Co., 246 Fed. (E.D. Ky. 1917).
20122 U.S. 519 (1887).
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to the state court. Section 5 was expressly cited and applied. This
decision is also good law and is followed by the courts.2 1
The theory of the Seeligson case seems to be followed when the
cause is removed because a separable controversy exists and the
suit against the party alleging the separable controversy is dis-
missed.22 It is followed where diversity of citizenship is lost by the
addition of a party plaintiff whose presence at the outset would have
prevented jurisdiction from vesting,23 but it is not followed where
diversity of citizenship is lost by the later addition of a party de-
fendant,21 unless the party added is an indispensable party to the
suit. 5 It is not followed where there is a later reduction of the
amount in controversy to a sum below the jurisdictional minimum; 6
nor where there is a change in citizenship of a party which, if exist-
ing in the beginning of the suit, would have prevented the court
from taking jurisdiction.27
Jurisdiction, originally acquired in good faith, has, then, been
held divested most often in cases where a separable controversy has
ceased to exist or where diversity of citizenship has been lost by
addition of a party plaintiff. In these two types of cases, alone, is
the omission from Section 5 of the words, "really and substantially
involve a dispute or controversy within the jurisdiction of the dis-
trict court," likely to have any effect. In these two situations the
courts may be forced to retain jurisdiction over cases which were
formerly dismissed or remanded. Such seems to be the weight of
opinion among those who have analyzed Section 5. There can be no
final answer until H.R. 3214 becomes law and cases are decided
under the new statute.
Richard 0. Gantz
21Torrence v. Shedd, 144 U.S. 527 (1891); Henson v. Eichhorn, 24 F.
Supp. 842 (E.D. Ill. 1938); Bane v. Keefer, 66 Fed. 610 (D. Ind. 1895);
Youtsey v. Hoffman, 108 Fed. 699 (D. Ky. 1901).
22Sklarsky v. A. & P. Tea Co., 47 F. 2d 662 (S.D. N.Y. 1931); Roecker
v. Railways Express Agency, 63 F. Supp. 65 (W.D. Mo. 1945); Summers
and Oppenheim v. Tillinghast Stiles Co., 19 F. Supp. 230 (S.D. N.Y. 1937);
Iowa Homestead Co. v. Des Moines Navigation and R.R., 8 Fed. 97 (C.C.S.D.
Iowa 1881).
23 Gaddis v. Junker, 27 F. 2d 156 (E.D. Tex. 1928); Forrest Oil Co. v.
Crawford, 101 Fed. 849 (C.C.A. 3d 1900).
2-Phelps v. Oaks, 117 U.S. 236 (1886).
2 Fryer v. Weakley, 261 Fed. 509 (C.C.A. 8th 1919).
26 Indian Refining Co. v. Valvoline Oil Co., 75 F. 2d 797 (C.C.A. 7th
1935); Morrow v. Mutual Casualty Co., 20 F. Supp. 193 (E.D. Ky. 1937);
N. Y. Life Insurance Co. v. Kaufman, 78 F. 2d 398 (C.C.A. 9th 1935), cert.
denied, 296 U.S. 626 (1935); Cohn v. Kramer, 124 F. 2d 791 (C.C.A. 6th
1942).27 1Houser v. Clayton, 12 Fed. Cas. 600, No. 6739 (C.C.E.D. Tex. 1878).
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